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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the similarities and differences between the French and American presidential election campaigns of 1988, focusing in particular on the processes of political communication. After discussing the framework of law, tradition, and climate of opinion within which political campaigns take place in these two countries, the paper compares and contrasts the media use and messages of the two campaigns, analyzing in turn each of the following elements: (1) affiches (posters of various sizes and colors plastered on walls, the most omnipresent medium of communication in a French election campaign); (2) meetings and rallies; (3) print media; (4) mail; (5) radio; (6) television--direct access; (7) television--indirect access; (8) new media technologies; and (9) political satire. Having examined the similarities and differences in the media of communication of the two presidential campaigns, the paper compares the messages communicated on the following topics: the Soviet Union and national defense; the economy; crime and punishment; images of leadership; and "playing both ends along with the middle." Lastly, the paper discusses the final results and draws conclusions. Fifty-six notes are included. (SR)

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By
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A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES: MEDIA AND MESSAGES OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS OF 1988

By
Franklyn S. Haiman

Franklyn S. Haiman is John Evans Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University. He is indebted to the Institute for Modern Communications and the Law and Social Science Program, both of Northwestern University, for their support of this project.

In 1987, Americans celebrated the Bicentennial of the adoption of a Constitution for the United States. In 1989, the people of France are celebrating the Bicentennial of a revolution which started them on the road to democracy. During the year in between, both nations engaged in what my be the most visible exercise of citizenship in a modern democrative society -- the election of a president.

France and the United States are no strangers to parallel historical events and bonds of mutual influence. Both were born in revolution and shared the political philosophies that shaped their structures of government. French military assistance was critical to the firm establishment of American independence in the 18th century, and American military power was twice crucial to the rescue of French freedom in the 20th century. French intellectual and artistic influences have pervaded the development of American culture, and modern American cultural influences, for better or worse, now permeate French society. From the days of Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in Paris to those of Alexis de Tocqueville in the United States, our two societies have continually learned from one another about the art and science of politics. It was the premise of this study that a careful analysis of the similarities and differences between the French and American presidential election campaigns of 1988 might also yield useful learning, on both sides of the Atlantic, about the processes of political communication.

To accomplish this purpose it was, of course, necessary to

observe both campaigns at first hand. I, therefore, went to France at the end of March, 1988, and remained for the six weeks that preceded the final round of presidential voting on May 8, as well as for the rest of May and June, when the fall-out from that election led to additional rounds of voting for a new parliament. I followed the story of the presidential campaign as it was told in the major daily Paris newspapers and in the leading French weekly news magazines;[1] listened regularly to daily television news broadcasts;[2] watched most of the televised interview programs with the candidates,[3] as well as all the official free-time campaign emissions;[4] visited the campaign headquarters of the five major contenders and attended press conference at one of them;[5] gathered the political literature handed out at our neighborhood street market;[6] took pictures of the campaign signs posted around Paris; went to a political meeting for Raymond Barre on a press bus; [8] and attended the last, massive Paris-area Mitterand rally.[9]

I returned to the United States in time to follow the American campaign from the Republican convention in August until the election on November 8. I read the story of that campaign as it was reported daily in the news columns and opinion pages of the New York Times and Chicago Tribune; watched excerpts from the candidates' day-to-day stump speeches carried with regularity on public television's MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour; viewed the presidential candidates' convention acceptance speeches[10] and the presidential and vice-presidential debates;[11] monitored a broad range of televised campaign news and commentary, political

advertisements, and interviews with the candidates;[12] and attended a Chicago-area Dukakis rally.[13]

In order to compare and contrast, in a meaningful way, the communication processes of the French and American political campaigns, one must first understand the most relevant aspects of the framework of law and custom within which they take place.

First and foremost, instead of the American system of a long season of primaries, followed by party conventions and a three-month general election campaign, the French field of candidates (nine of them in 1988), each put forward by a political party, is narrowed by two rounds of voting just two weeks apart, with the two top vote-getters in the first round competing for a majority in the second round.[14] Furthermore, the "official" campaign period is limited by law to the three weeks preceding the first round of voting plus the two weeks between rounds. Nevertheless, much unofficial campaigning takes place many weeks before that time period, albeit of a different nature from that which is legally permitted during the official campaign. For example, the "affiches" (wall posters and billboards) which are a staple of French political campaigns, are unregulated and appear in profusion prior to official campaign periods, but are restricted in size and limited to official bulletin boards thereafter. Paid political advertising is permitted in the print media prior to the official campaign period and prohibited thereafter, but is not allowed at any time on radio and television.[15] Publication of public opinion polls about voter intentions, even more ubiquitous (if that is

possible) in France than in the U.S., is prohibited for one week prior to each round of voting.[16]

Attempts to reform and regulate campaign financing in the interest of greater equality of opportunity for candidates and greater public awareness of their sources of support have been undertaken in somewhat similar ways in the two countries, with the major piece of French legislation on the matter adopted only a few weeks before the 1988 campaign.[17] The laws of both nations now require disclosure of contributions to candidates, provide some public financing for presidential campaigns, and place limits on total campaign expenditures.[18] But in the U.S., because of a First Amendment decision of the Supreme Court,[19] the spending limits apply only to the campaign committees of the candidates themselves, and only if they have accepted public funding, leaving a loophole for the increasingly enormous separate expenditures by the political parties or by anybody else who "independently" campaigns for a candidate. Although total expenditures above the prescribed ceiling are presumably not permitted by the French law, it appears that at least one of the candidates in the 1988 campaign vastly exceeded those limits.[20]

The most significant differences between the French and American rules governing political campaign communication are those having to do with candidate access to radio and television. Televised political "commercials" are the most extensive and expensive form of campaign communication in the United States; they are entirely forbidden in France. Free air time is provided to

each of the candidates on the publicly owned French radio and television channels during the two weeks preceding the first round of voting and the week preceding the second round, and that time is apportioned equally to every candidate, major or minor.[21] No such opportunity is available in the United States. French broadcasters, whether public or private, are required to be fair to all of the candidates in the amount of news coverage and interview time devoted to them, and generally avoid interview programs altogether during the period of the free-time campaign emissions.[22] The only legal requirements imposed on American broadcasters are that "reasonable" opportunity must be given to candidates for the purchase of air time and that, when such time is sold to one candidate, all other candidates must have the opportunity to buy the same amount of time, if they want to do so and can afford it.[23] Although most American broadcasters, motivated by their own sense of journalistic ethics as well as by a wish not to alienate large segments of the public, generally try to give roughly equal news and interview time to the major-party presidential candidates and their spokespersons, they appear to feel no similar obligation to minor party candidates, and they are clearly under no legal requirement to do so.[24]

There are also sharp differences and striking similarities between French and American political traditions and climates of opinion. Although the media in both countries described their respective publics as bored by the 1988 presidential campaigns, the French turned out to vote -- as customary -- at 81.5% of the

electorate in the first round and 84.5% in the second round,[25] whereas only 50% of those Americans eligible to vote -- even fewer than has been typical in recent elections -- went to the polls.[26]

In addition to the dramatic difference in voter turnout, another clear distinction between French and American presidential elections is the probable familiarity to the public of the leading contenders. The seniority system of French political life makes it virtually impossible for a Jimmy Carter or Michael Dukakis to emerge from relative obscurity on the national scene to become a major-party candidate or, if the French had running mates, for a J. Danforth Quayle to be selected for such a position. Even Francois Leotard, a bright, articulate and telegenic young leader of one of the member parties of the conservative coalition, who had paid his dues in the system and is very well known to the voters, found it necessary, in 1988, to postpone his presidential ambitions to give way to more senior men.

Although the domestic and foreign policy problems of any two nations will obviously differ in their specifics, there were some surprising similarities in the major issues which the French and American candidates faced in 1988. Anxieties about the economic future -- budget and trade deficits in the U.S., unemployment and competition from the European community in France -- were strongly felt in both countries. The questions as to which of the candidates would be strongest on national defense and toughest on crime were high on the agenda of both electorates. And lurking only slightly beneath the surface of the joblessness and crime

issues were racial tensions involving Blacks and Hispanics in the U.S. and Arab immigrants in France.

Given this framework of law, tradition, and climate of opinion, what comparisons and contrasts in the media and messages of these two 1988 campaigns stand out as the most salient? First the media.

AFFICHES

As already noted, the most omnipresent medium of communication in a French election campaign -- 1988 being no exception -- are the "affiches," posters of various sizes and colors plastered on walls, kiosks, utility poles, and commercial billboards up until three weeks before the first round of voting, and on officially erected emplacements of uniform size at busy traffic intersections thereafter. Typically there will be a picture of the candidate's face plus a brief slogan, such as Mitterand's "La France Unie" (France United) and Chirac's "Nous Irons Plus Loin Ensemble" (We Will Go Further Together). Often there will also be tampering with the posters by opponents, such as the conversion of "La France Unie" to "La France Punie" (France Punished), or printed banners superimposed upon them -- like "Generation Mitterand Chomage" (Mitterand, Generation of Unemployment).

As one traversed most streets of the United States in the Fall of 1988, however, one saw, much less frequently than in previous presidential campaigns, yard and window signs or car bumper stickers promoting the candidates. Billboards, ordinarily used in state and local elections more than national ones, played a

prominent role in the wide-open spaces of Texas, charging that Dukakis would take away everyone's guns, but as a general rule signs and posters were not that much in evidence.

Surely the American voter has suffered no loss of valuable information about the candidates as a result of the diminished presence of these abbreviated forms of communication. There is a reduction, however, in the public's sense of physical and psychological closeness to, and involvement in, a campaign. Not that we would want to emulate the French defacement of each others' affiches or, more seriously, the occasional violence that flares up between rival "colleurs" (pasters-up of posters).[27] But those incidents do indicate a feeling of personal commitment for which a more civil equivalent may be the putting of a bumper sticker on one's car, a sign in one's window, or a button on one's lapel. And seeing a plethora of campaign posters as people walk or ride the streets of their community provides a sense of immediacy and of being surrounded by an event that they are not likely to get from watching a television screen.

MEETINGS AND RALLIES

It would be difficult to know what side of the Atlantic one was on if the language were the same and the only other clues one had came from attending a French or American campaign meeting or rally. The audience, most commonly, would consist of the candidate's partisans and, for some of the largest rallies may even have been bussed in for the occasion. Campaign literature would be handed to people as they approached the gathering place and hot

dogs (or grilled sausage) and cokes could be purchased by the hungry at outdoor stands along the way. There would be banners, flags, music and huge closed-circuit television screens strategically located to carry the activities occurring on the platform, larger than life, to the farthest reaches of the crowd. There might be a filmed biographical sketch of the candidate shown on that screen as an introduction to the live appearance. The platform would be crowded with seats for all the local dignitaries, and, above all, the candidate's appearance and speech would be planned and timed to maximize the possibility of its being covered on that evening's television news.[28] The crowd would interrupt the speaker with frequent cheers and applause; only occasionally would hecklers and bearers of hostile placards make it to the fringes of the event. One difference only would be noticed, and acutely so, by the American observer in France, and that would be the length of the candidate's speech. Unless the American were an unlikely one hundred years old, or more, he would not be able to recall ever having stood, or even sat, for nearly two hours anywhere in the U.S. listening to a campaign speech.[29]

PRINT MEDIA

Neither French nor American presidential candidates do much paid advertising in newspapers and magazines, though frequently groups which support them will buy full-page ads to urge their election. Unlike most American newspapers, their French counterparts do not run specific editorial endorsements just before the election; they do not really need to since the biases of most

of them have already been made clear in their news coverage of the campaign. Some, like Le Figaro, owned by the ultra-conservative Robert Hersant, and L'Humanite, the organ of the Communist party, were little more than propaganda sheets for their chosen candidates in the 1988 campaign;[30] others, such as the prestigious Le Monde, maintained a much greater degree of balance in their coverage.

Undoubtedly the most striking print-medium event of the 1988 French presidential campaign -- unique even for French elections and unimaginable in the U.S. -- was the purchase by the Mitterand campaign of a dozen or so (depending on the size of page and print) full pages in 23 newspapers throughout the country for the publication on April 7 of a lengthy "Lettre a Tous Les Francais" (Letter to All of the French), edited personally by the President and setting forth his goals and his program for the years ahead.[31] Said the editor of the newspaper Liberation, Serge July, of this event:

> ....this letter is a landmark in the history of communication; Mitterand passes from one medium to another, uses everything on the keyboard.....to the point of reviving the written word, in its most classic form, that of the letter, a form that intellectuals of the 18th century used so much.....A letter is also an individual act.....it signifies a relationship, almost an intimacy that the simple stating of propositions would not be able to express.
>
> Mitterand's letter is too long, but that is almost

> deliberate; the length, combined with the austerity of the printed page, signified more than anything, the seriousness of the enterprise. To the accusation of fuzziness, Mitterand responds with a long and tedious essay.... Most voters will undoubtedly not read to the end of this letter, but they will have the sense that Mitterand has, as they say, many things to say.[32]

MAIL

The medium of the mail is used in important, but very different, ways in French and American political campaigns. In the U.S., direct mail to computer-targeted audiences is a primary means of soliciting money for a campaign and of seeking to influence voters on the basis of narrowly designed appeals to special interests. In a more subtle and indirect way, the year-round free mailing privilege enjoyed by Congressmen and Senators for the purpose of communicating with their constituents is one of the many advantages enjoyed by legislative incumbents over their challengers, though this particular bonus is not available to an incumbent president running for re-election.

In a French election every voter receives an envelope mailed out at government expense, labelled "URGENT. ELECTIONS," containing a four-page 8 1/2" x 12" piece of campaign literature from each of the candidates, bearing their picture and position statements. There were separate mailings before the first and second rounds of voting in 1988 -- the first containing brochures from each of the nine candidates and the second enclosing new statements from the

two finalists. This is similar to what is often done at the state level in the U.S. when there are referenda on the ballot, or in some places even for candidates. It is difficult to know how much of this kind of material may be read or have an influence on the voter, but at least it provides a cost-free opportunity for every candidate to have equal access to the electorate.

RADIO

Despite the primacy of television in affecting the election of a president in France and the U.S., radio remains a popular medium in both countries and still plays an important part in election campaigns. In the U.S., where electronic political advertising is permitted and where, for a relatively small cost, radio audiences with particular racial, ethnic, age, and cultural profiles can be targeted, the radio is a useful vehicle for certain of the candidates' messages. In France, where radio networks, whether public or private, cover the entire nation, the radio plays a quite different role in political campaigns. It is the medium which specializes in interviews with candidates and their surrogates -- encounters whose substance is then often reported in the newspapers, and sometimes even excerpted on TV news, giving the interviewee two or three bites of the media apple.

TELEVISION - DIRECT ACCESS

Both France and the United States provide a single means of access to television in which the candidate controls, within some limits, both the form and substance of the message. But those means could not be more different from one another, nor could that

difference be more significant in its impact on the political process.

In France, as we have already noted, paid political advertising is not permitted on television.[33] Instead, every candidate is given an equal amount of free time during the official campaign period on the two public television networks, A2 and FR3, and the public radio network, France Inter. During the two weeks prior to the first round of voting in 1988, from Monday through Friday, April 11-15 and 18-22, each of the nine candidates, in an order determined by lottery, had 5-minute blocks of time at the beginning and end of the two-week period, and four 15-minute blocks in between. The 15-minute messages were broadcast at three different time periods -- morning, noon, and night -- on one or the other of the two public TV networks, and at both noon and night on radio. During the week prior to the second round of voting, May 2-6, Chirac and Mitterand were given five minutes for an initial message broadcast twice on Monday night and again on Tuesday afternoon, a 15-minute slot aired twice on Wednesday night, another 15-minute slot aired on Thursday night and Friday afternoon, and a final five minute message broadcast twice on Friday night.

The rules governing these broadcasts allow only one of them to be filmed outside the studio, limit the use of film clips to a maximum of 40% of the time, restrict the number of panelists or questioners (if they are used at all) to four, and prohibit the display of the flag or national colors (red, white, and blue - like ours) or the playing of the national anthem.[34] What remains for

the bulk of the time is either the candidate's "talking head" or a more or less stilted interview with the candidate. This has the great advantage of forcing a discussion of issues (though carefully selected and planned for), but the disadvantage of attracting a very small audience.[35]

In the U.S., of course, direct access is obtained only through the purchase of time, usually in thirty second spot advertisements as to which there is no limit in either format or content and which, like radio ads, can and do target particular geographical areas with messages tailored for that audience.[36] Occasionally a presidential campaign, like that of Dukakis, will air a few five-minute spots, which <u>might</u> contain more substance than can be compressed into thirty seconds, and in 1988 both candidates purchased full half-hours on the three major TV networks simultaneously for election eve finales.[37] The experience of 1988, to an even greater extent than previous presidential campaigns, was that thirty second political advertisements typically oversimplify the issues, often mislead their audience, and surely to the extent used by the Bush campaign to distort the record and savage the persona of their opponent, debase the political process. Whether these evils are inherent to this particular medium, or merely an abuse of it by cynical campaign strategists, remains an open question. What seems more certain is that political advertisements on American television have a far greater impact on the outcome of a presidential election, albeit it for ill, then do the free-time broadcasts of the French candidates. Whether the latter form of

latter form of communication could be redesigned to attract more attention and have more influence is also an open question.

TELEVISION - INDIRECT ACCESS

Coverage of the 1988 presidential campaigns on French and American television news programs differed more in degree than in kind. Both provided daily visual reports of what the candidates were doing on the campaign trail, with film clip excerpts of their speeches and handshaking. Consistently, however, the French network news, though a half-hour in length as in the U.S., carried longer segments of the speeches, not just the punchy one-liners of the day. Only the U.S. public broadcasting's MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour did as much.

Both French and American television also have regular interview programs like Meet the Press, Face the Nation, and Nightline in the U.S. and L'Heure de Verite (The Hour of Truth) and Questions a Domicile (Questions at Home) in France, to which the candidates are invited during a presidential campaign. In both countries the vigor of the examination varies with the interviewer, although the greater length of the French programs generally allows for more follow-up questioning.[38] Unlike the American campaign, in which Michael Dukakis eagerly accepted the opportunities offered to him to be interviewed,[39] and George Bush declined most of them,[40] the leading French candidates all took their turn.[41] Perhaps because political leaders in France are invariably highly articulate, and would probably be regarded with suspicion by the public if they avoided verbal encounters with the press, it is rare

that a French candidate would turn down a TV interview invitation.

In both France and the U.S. candidates participate in so-called televised debates, but there the similarity ends. In 1988, the American presidential candidates faced each other twice before the cameras, and the vice-presidential candidates once, for 90-minute sessions each. They responded to questions from panels of four journalists with answers limited to two minutes (mostly well prepared in advance) and comments of one minute in response to their opponent's answers. Each also was given time for a brief closing statement. Little that was spontaneous was possible or occurred, given this format and well-rehearsed candidates. So programmed and controlled by campaign strategists had these events become that the League of Women Voters, itself not noted for rash actions, withdrew its sponsorship of the second "debate."

In France the big "Duel" (as the presidential debates have been dubbed[42]) occurred between finalists Chirac and Mitterand ten days before the second round of voting, and was witnessed by over half of the television viewers in the nation.[43] It had been scheduled to air for one hour and fifty minutes over the two major TV networks -- the recently privatized TF1 and the still public A2 -- but, in keeping with the somewhat casual French attitude toward observing fixed time schedules on television, it actually went on for two hours and fifteen minutes (from 8:30-10:45 p.m.). Two moderators, one male and one female, presided in tandem, and the candidates were seated across a table from one another. The debate was divided into four general topic areas -- domestic policy and

institutions, European economic affairs, social issues, and foreign affairs/defense -- and within each area the candidates were to have the same amount of total talking time (clocked by the moderators). There were no specific limits within that general parameter; that is, a candidate could talk at some length at one time and very briefly at another, as he chose. A moderator would pose a questions to one of the candidates; the other would interrupt or jump in whenever he could; and the two would talk back and forth to each other without intervention by the moderators until one of the latter felt it was time to move on to another question. Each candidate had three minutes at the end for a final statement, obviously pre-planned and the only segment resembling the American format.

NEW MEDIA TECHNOLOGIES

The 1988 presidential campaigns in both France and the U.S. saw the beginnings of new technologies which are likely to transform the nature of these contests in the future. In the U.S., for example, it was the introduction of campaign messages on video cassettes which were sent out to individuals and groups to play on their now-ubiquitous VCRs. In France, it was the use of Minitel, a system through which subscribers could phone in a question and receive the candidate's response on their home screens. These and other mechanisms of so-called "narrow-casting" are certain to gain in popularity with campaign strategists eager to tell one group of voters what they would just as soon not have others hear or what others might have no interest in hearing, and to do it in a cost-

efficient way.[44]

POLITICAL SATIRE

For those seeking sorely needed comic relief from the platitudinous rhetoric of both French and American candidates, political cartoons of a similar nature were to be found in abundance by the readers of newspapers and magazines in each nation. But for television viewers, as for restaurant-goers, a far richer cuisine was available to the French than to the Americans. In the U.S. there was but one half-hour of Mark Russell on the Public Broadcasting System ten days before the election. In France there was the dazzlingly popular[45] Bebete show -- every week night during the campaign for a few minutes before the 8 p.m. evening news on TF 1 -- where animal-like puppet creatures representing each of the candidates (e.g. Barzy (Barre), the bear; Kermitterand, the frog) made themselves and their real-life counterparts look utterly foolish. At the same time that they take their politics more seriously than Americans, the French also know better how to puncture a politician's balloon.

Having examined the similarities and differences in the media of communication of the two presidential campaigns, we now turn to a comparison of the messages communicated.

THE SOVIET UNION AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

A central theme of every major candidate in both the U.S. and France was that he was the one who would be the most effective in taking advantage of the changes occurring under Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, while cautiously maintaining a strong and efficient

military defense. The incumbent President Mitterand and Vice-President Bush invoked their experience in office as support for this claim, with their opponents having to resort to the argument that they would bring fresh and more aggressive leadership to the task. The challengers seemed unable to score successfully on this issue in either country; on the contrary, in the United States, the Bush campaign was able to convince at least some of the voters that Dukakis would be too soft on defense and too inexperienced in dealing with foreign leaders to trust with the presidency.

THE ECONOMY

Despite a general state of economic well-being in France and the U.S. in 1988, both countries faced serious problems for which incumbent leaders were blamed and with respect to which the challengers promised to do better. On the other hand, the incumbents pointed with pride to the economic gains made during their regimes and suggested to the voters that it would be folly to change directions.

In the U.S., the economic problems with which the Reagan/Bush administration was belabored were the federal budget deficits, the trade deficit, the selling of America to Japan and other foreigners, and the failure to address the issue of health care for millions of uninsured Americans. George Bush, on the other hand, reminded voters of the dramatic reduction in the inflation and interest rates that had occurred in eight years of Reaganomics and the number of new jobs that had been created.

In France it was the failure of the Socialists, despite their

promises when seeking office, to make any significant dent in the high rate of unemployment that provided a major theme for their conservative challengers. At the same time President Mitterand took credit for moving the country toward a position from which it would gain great benefit from the full economic integration of the European community planned for 1992.

CRIME AND PUNISHMENT

High on the agenda of concerns of both electorates was the problem of crime, with the special twist in the U.S. of its relationship to drugs, and in both countries its link to race. Speeches by National Front candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, and flyers distributed by Republican state parties in Maryland and Illinois, were quite explicit in attributing the problem of social violence to permissiveness of leaders like Dukakis and Mitterand toward the suggested criminal tendencies of Blacks and Arabs. Bush and Chirac were only slightly more subtle, the former scoring heavily against Dukakis on the furloughing of Willie Horton and his opposition to the death penalty, and Chirac hitting hard on Mitterand's proposed vote for immigrants,[46] and his own tough crack-down on terrorism during his preceding two years as prime minister.[47] To counter these kinds of appeals, Dukakis tried in vain to pin the Reagan administration's failure in the war against drugs on George bush and to convince the voters that Massachusetts had one of the lowest crime rates in the nation. Mitterand, from the lofty heights of his incumbency, barely deigned to respond to this issue, noting only that Chirac himself had once favored a vote

for immigrants and that he, Mitterand, was and would continue to be president of all the people.

IMAGES OF LEADERSHIP

One of the most striking, and probably most significant, aspects of the French and American presidential campaigns of 1988 was the saga of the images of the candidates -- images that were transformed in the U.S. and reinforced in France through the messages of the media.

The remarkable American transformations, orchestrated by Bush strategists Lee Atwater, Roger Ailes and company, were those of George Bush from Wimp to Rambo (with a corresponding decline in negative public attitudes), of Michael Dukakis from Decent and Competent Technocrat to Inexperienced Bleeding Heart Liberal (with a corresponding increase in negative public attitudes), and of J.Danforth Quayle from Spoiled Air-Head to Disappearing Irrelevancy.

For Bush the metamorphosis began with his acceptance speech at the Republic convention in New Orleans, from "read my lips" about no new taxes to "I am that man" prepared to sit behind the desk in the oval office. It culminated in the second debate, where he exuded ease and confidence, as well he could with everything falling his way.

For Dukakis the transmutation started with the negative TV spots about the Massachusetts furlough program. It continued with his silly ride in a tank, his card-carrying membership in the ACLU, the dreaded label of liberalism, and his failure to hit back

quickly, hard or skillfully on crime and patriotism. It culminated with his lecturette on the drug problem in response to the opening question in the second debate about the hypothetical rape and murder of his wife, Kitty.

For Quayle the question of his fitness to be a heartbeat away from the presidency commenced with the revelations of his problematic enrollments in the national guard and law school. It was aggravated each time he tried to explain himself or to address a serious national issue. The Bush campaign's solution was to keep him away from interviews with the press, send him off to campaign in small towns and before school audiences, omit his name from most "Bush for President" signs, and mention not one word of him in the entire half-hour of the Bush election eve broadcast. The sickest joke of post-election week was that President-elect Bush had passed the word to the Secret Service that if he were assassinated the first thing they should do is shoot Danny Quayle.

In France it was image maintenance rather than change that characterized the campaign. Francois Mitterand played his statuesque presidential role to the hilt, first by delaying the announcement of his candidacy to the very last possible moment; then responding to the charge that his plans for France's future were a "flou" (a haze) with his overwhelming letter to all the French. His rallies were grandiose events -- mammoth red, white and blue banners fluttering in the breeze behind a highly elevated stage, the candidate marching alone on a long walkway to the platform to the strains of martial music and the cheers of the

assembled throng. Condescension was in his voice each time he addressed his opponent in the TV debate as "Monsieur le Premier Ministre" (Mr. Prime Minister), and although Jacques Chirac assiduously and repeatedly referred to the man across the table only as "Monsieur Mitterand," he revealed once (and that was once too much) their true hierarchical relationship, addressing him during a fast exchange as "Monsieur le President."[48]

Chirac, on the other hand, try as he might, was never able to overcome his image as an effective but calculating manipulator -- a view of him encapsulated by graffiti on some of his affiches showing the words, "Qui vais-je trahir?" (Who am I going to betray?) coming out of his mouth. It was obviously very discouraging for him, after appearing for 90 minutes on the Hour of Truth television interview of April 7, to be confronted with their usual end-of-interview poll results showing that listeners other than those who were already his partisans to start with had a less favorable attitude toward him at the end of the program than at the beginning.

The other major candidates in the first round of voting, the centrist Raymond Barre and far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen, also saw the images with which they went into the campaign intensified as it progressed, as much a result of their own doing as that of their opponents. The Barre campaign made an admitted mistake of widely disseminating an early poster with the candidate's picture and the slogan "Du Serieux, Du Solide, Du Vrai" (Serious, Solid and True) -- all apt descriptions of the former economics professor but not

ones that would excite an enthusiastic following among a broad spectrum of voters. Barre's speeches and interviews increased the respect the electorate had for his knowledge and integrity, but those were apparently not the images with which to woo enough conservatives from Chirac and moderates from Mitterand to move Barre from third to second place on the tally sheet.

The image of Le Pen, before, during, and after the campaign was the polar opposite of Barre's. Here was the flamboyant, energetic demagogue -- "L'Outsider" -- flailing away at both the Socialist and Conservative establishments for giving France away to the immigrants. "Defendons nos couleurs" (Defend Our Colors) proclaimed his affiches, with the viewer left to complete the enthymeme -- against whom? One poster of uncertain sponsorship, perhaps not Le Pen's, supplied the answer. "Dans vingt ans, c'est sur, la France sera une republique islamique" (In twenty years, it's certain, France will be an Islamic republic).

PLAYING BOTH ENDS ALONG WITH THE MIDDLE

By far the most pronounced and profound similarity between the French and American campaigns of 1988 was the schizophrenic effort of all of them to appeal to the voters of the center while at the same time holding on to their natural bases and luring those at the extremes.

For Francois Mitterand this meant downplaying his identity as the Socialist Party standard bearer and talking of a new government that might include centrists and the non-aligned. He was even heckled at a rally in Rennes for suggesting that there were some

good people to be found on the political right.[49] There would be no further nationalizations of business and industry, nor would he attempt to undo the privatizations that the Chirac government had accomplished during the previous two years. As election day approached, and Socialist Party stalwarts became restive from inattention, he took out time to stroke them and bring them more actively into the campaign.[50] He reiterated his advocacy of a vote for immigrants in local elections, and emphasized the economic opportunities for all that would come with the integration of Europe in 1992. Although his seven years in the presidency had seen the progressive weakening of the Communist Party, he succeeded in convincing them he was the lesser of two evils and won their endorsement and votes for the second round of the election.

Jacques Chirac was also busy cultivating the center, trying hard to soften his image, invoking the support of Raymond Barre and former moderate President Giscard d'Estaing. He had, in fact, been immensely successful during his two years as prime minister in holding together the coalition of center and conservative parties that had won a majority in the parliamentary election of 1986, and he called for the continued unity of that coalition. At the same time his hard-line Interior Minister Charles Pasqua was cultivating the extreme right, going so far as to say in an interview that the supporters of the National Front shared essentially the same values as the conservative majority.[51]

The task confronting Michael Dukakis -- to hold on to the votes of Blacks and activist liberals while persuading so-called

Reagan Democrats (including many working class Catholics, affluent Jews, and white Protestant Southerners) to return to the Democratic fold -- was formidable, if not insurmountable. But no one can fault him for not trying, although this meant embracing Jesse Jackson one day and cold-shouldering him the next, dodging the label of liberal for many weeks and proudly proclaiming it toward the end, choosing Lloyd Bentsen as a running mate to help win Texas and perhaps some other Southern states while remaining unequivocally opposed to policies popular in the South, such as aid to the Nicaraguan contras, heavy military expenditures, the death penalty, and unlimited access to guns. These efforts, not surprisingly, were only partially successul. Blacks who voted did support him overwhelmingly, but their turnout was disappointingly low. Many Reagan Democrats did return to the fold, but many others did not. Texans could and did vote for Bentsen (for the U.S. Senate) but not for Dukakis/Bentsen, and the rest of the South never even gave Dukakis a fighting chance.

George Bush, on the other hand, had considerable success in convincing both the middle and the right that he was one of them, with such remarkable statements as his promise that he would appoint to the judiciary moderate people of conservative views. Like Dukakis, his choice of a running mate was apparently intended to mollify the most conservative elements of his constituency. So, too, were his promotion of prayer and pledges of allegiance in the public schools, death for criminals and life for the unborn, and his bashing of card-carrying membership in the ACLU. But then came

along the Bush/Dr. Jekyll of "mainstream values," with dreams of a kinder, gentler America, child care programs, environmental clean-ups, and the desire to become known as the Education President.

THE FINAL RESULTS

When election night finally arrived on each side of the Atlantic, the incumbent Francois Mitterand had been re-elected President of the Republic of France by a margin of 54% - 46%, and the incumbent Vice-President George Bush had been selected as President of the United States of America by identically the same percentages. To no one's surprise in either country, the higher a voter stood on the economic ladder the more likely he or she was to have voted conservative or Republican.[52]

Six days after his re-election, on May 14, 1988, President Mitterand dissolved the French parliament that had been elected two years previously with a conservative majority; set new elections, with a first round on June 5 and a second round on June 12; and called upon the voters to reaffirm the mandate they had given him to govern by putting the legislative branch back into the hands of a Socialist majority. But when the votes were counted the Socialists and allied small parties held only 276 seats, thirteen short of the 289 required to achieve an absolute majority. The Prime Minister named by President Mitterand could thus command only a plurality of votes and would be dependent on the support of either a dozen Communists or centrists, or upon a handful of abstentions, to get any legislation adopted.

George Bush faced an even more difficult situation. Despite a comfortable margin of 8% of the popular vote, and a sweep of the electoral votes of 40 out of 50 states, he faced a Congress whose Democratic majority in both the House and Senate had actually been strengthened. American voters in 1988, even more definitively than their French counterparts, had opted for divided government.

CONCLUSIONS

It is tempting to conclude from a comparison of the results of the French and American presidential elections of 1988 that the campaigns of the candidates made no great difference to the outcomes; that both elections were determined instead by economic self-interest, racial prejudice, the overwhelming power of incumbency in a time of relative peace and prosperity, and a desire of voters to maintain a system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches of their governments. Although it may well be true that such forces were determinative for a large proportion of the two electorates, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the mere 5% of votes required to have reversed the results was decisively influenced by the media and messages of the campaigns. A tracking of public opinion polls in the two countries during the weeks before the elections would indicate that this was far more likely to have been the case in the United States than in France,[53] but no candidate in either place can afford to assume that the kind of campaign communication in which they engage is irrelevant to the results.

What, then, can be learned from the similarities and

differences between the French and American campaigns of 1988 that might improve the way such campaigns are conducted?

It is clear, first and foremost, that neither country has yet effectively or equitably solved the problem of the financing of political campaigns, although it has become a much more critical issue in the United States because of the size and geographical spread of the electorate and the freedom to use the electronic media for paid advertising. The imposition of legal limits on campaign income and expenditures appears impossible of fair and effective enforcement, in part because of valuable non-monetary contributions that there is no way to count, in part because of deliberate or inadvertent non-reporting, in part because of the supportive effects of individuals, groups and media supposedly (and often in fact) acting independently of the official campaigns, and, in the U.S., because of First Amendment barriers to the regulation of speech.

Public financing as a partial or total substitute for private contributions is likewise plagued with difficulties. Taxpayers, understandably, are reluctant to see support given out on an equal basis to mainstream and off-stream party candidates, yet any other system discriminates in favor of established parties and against those who may need the help the most. The effort, in the U.S., to use the bait of public financing as a way to avoid the First Amendment prohibition against limits on total spending,[54] has proven to be an abysmal failure, with so-called soft money expenditures by the political parties and allegedly independent spending by

other groups, neither of whom are covered by the restrictions on the candidates themselves, starting to dwarf the activities of the official campaign committee.

There are certain kinds of partial public financial support, however, which can be granted equally to all candidates without the complications noted here, and France provides the model for this with its free mailings and free time on radio and television. These opportunities could be expanded in both countries, not only in length and frequency, but extended to privately owned and operated electronic media through government subsidies, tax deductions, or simply a quid pro quo for the obtaining of a license to broadcast.

The experience of having observed a presidential campaign in France without television "commercials," followed in short order by an inundation with the kind of TV spot advertisements that characterized the 1988 campaign in America, arouses an almost overwhelming inclination to advocate their total prohibition by law, everywhere and forever. However, not only is it unclear that they will continue to be banned in France,[55] but it is impossible to imagine how their legal interdiction in the U.S. could be reconciled with the First Amendment. One might hope, alternatively, that with a sufficiently generous allocation of free broadcast time to the candidates and enough negative public reaction to the present nature of paid advertisements, the latter might either die a natural death or be significantly improved in quality. Those are probably vain hopes; but if the amount of

creative intelligence and production skill that are now devoted, on both sides of the Atlantic, to the tarnishing of one's opponent's image and the flattering of one's own were channeled into the creation of free-time messages more lively and substantial in content and more enticing to the viewing public than the present French model, it is at least possible that the five or ten percent of voters who can make a difference in an election might be guided to more rational decisions.

There has been much discussion in the United States, since the election, of the inadequacies of the role played in the campaign by television news, with its tendency to report only brief "sound bites" from candidate speeches, to focus on campaign strategies rather than substance, and to do little critical analysis of platitudinous or misleading campaign rhetoric. Notably excepted from these complaints was the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour on PBS, which regularly carried lengthy excerpts from the stump speeches of the major candidates, had interviews with minor party candidates whom few people had ever seen or knew existed,[56] aired in-depth discussions with experts as well as representatives of the candidates on a wide range of campaign issues, and even did reports and analyses of the political paid advertisements appearing on the private networks.

French television news, both public and private, did longer excerpts from the speeches of candidates then the U.S. commercial networks, despite their equivalent half-hour time frame, but less than the hour-long MacNeil-Lehrer program. Like the three major

U.S. networks, however, they offered practically no critical analysis of the campaign rhetoric that was being disseminated. Both French and American TV news could take lessons from what MacNeil-Lehrer did, adapting, of course, to their shorter time spans and more heterogeneous audiences, which might actually have the advantage of forcing them to find ways to do it with a bit more zip and excitement.

As for the televised "debates," it is difficult to discern anything of value that France might learn from the U.S., while much that is useful could flow in the other direction. If the American debates are to produce any helpful insights for their audience, it must be made far more difficult for a candidate to get by with rehearsed speeches and evasions of hard questions. As in France, there should be no one or two minute time limits on a comment; candidates should be allowed to talk directly to each other -- interrupting, challenging, and pressing for answers to their questions; moderators or panels of questioners should not be able to control the entire agenda of topics that are addressed but leave latitude for the candidates to raise issues of their own. Whether American candidates, not all of them as well practiced in verbal skills as their French counterparts, will agree to such freer ground rules is a real problem -- especially if they are running far ahead in the polls -- but pressures can and should be developed by the media and the public to make it happen.

With regard to the messages of the campaign, winners Bush and Mitterand were both apparently able to persuade voters on the

opposite side of the political spectrum that they would be their safest choice, despite the actual allegiances those candidates held and the debts they owed -- to the left in the case of Mitterand and the right in the case of Bush. Their success at having done this will make it difficult, though still worth trying, to convince candidates of the future that it would be more honest to talk about the real, not mythical, ideological differences between liberals and conservatives, and that it would be healthier for the political system if they would concentrate on cultivating the support of constituencies whose interests they will actually work for after getting into office. Both the winners and losers in 1988 may have been better off to have done that. The losers might have won, and the winners, had they won anyhow, might find it easier to govern. Pandering to extremists, whose policies one has no serious intention of implementing, or to those on the opposite side of the center, whose values one does not truly represent, is misleading to all and may be a major contributing factor to the apathy and cynicism toward the political process felt by so many citizens.

NOTES

1. The daily newspapers regularly monitored were Le Monde, Liberation, and Le Figaro, with occasional reference to La Croix, Le Parisien, and L'Humanite. I also regularly read the weekly satirical newspaper, Le Canard Enchaine (The Chained Duck) and the weekly magazines Le Point, L'Express, Le Nouvel Observateur, L'Evenement du Jeudi, and Paris Match.

2. I listened most often to the 8 p.m. evening news on TF 1 and the 1 p.m. news on A 2. On occasion I would also watch Channel 6 news at 1:30 p.m. and FR 3's nightly news at 10:15 p.m.

3. These included TF 1's Questions a Domicile (Questions at Home) on March 31 from 8:40 - 10:30 p.m. with Francois Mitterand interviewed by Anne Sinclair and Jean Marie Colombani; A 2's L'Heure de Verite (Hour of Truth) from 8:35-10:00 p.m. on April 5 with Raymond Barre interviewed by Alain Duhamel, Serge July and Albert Du Roy and on April 7 with Jacques Chirac questioned by Alain Duhamel, Albert Du Roy, and Jean Boissonet; and Channel 5's half-hour interviews by Pierre Luc Seguillon at 8:15 p.m. on March 28 with Pierre Juquin (the Communist defector candidate), March 29 with Raymond Barre, and April 16 with Francois Mitterand. In addition to the above programs dedicated entirely to interviews, I watched several lengthy interviews with candidates conducted during the course of news programs: TF 1 on April 5 with Andre LaJoinie (the Communist Party candidate), on April 7 with Jean Marie Le Pen, and on April 14 with Arlette Laguiller (the Trotskyite candidate); and FR 3 on April 13 with Chirac, Le Pen and

Laguiller.

4. In the first round, I watched five-minute opening messages from each of the nine candidates on Monday, April 11; a first set of fifteen-minute messages on Tuesday, April 12 and Wednesday, April 13; a second set of fifteen-minute messages on Thursday, April 14 and Friday, April 15; a third set of fifteen-minute messages on Monday, April 18 and Tuesday, April 19; a fourth set of fifteen-minute messages on Wednesday, April 20 and Thursday April 21; and five-minute closing messages on Friday, April 22. In the second round, I viewed the five-minute opening messages of candidates Chirac and Mitterand on Monday, May 2; a first set of fifteen-minute messages on Wednesday, May 4; a second pair of fifteen-minute messages on Thursday, May 5; and final five-minute statements on Friday, May 6.

5. Visits were made to the Barre campaign headquarters on April 6 and 8. On April 7 I visited the headquarters of Jacques Chirac, Jean Marie LePen, Andre LaJoinie, and Francois Mitterand. I also attended 11 a.m. press conferences at Mitterand headquarters on April 8 and April 29. The first was the day of the release of the Mitterand letter and was conducted by former (and again after the election) Minister of Culture and Communication Jack Lang. The latter was the day following the Mitterand-Chirac debate and was conducted by Pierre Beregovoy, campaign chairman and former (and now again) Minister of Economics, Finance and Budget.

6. This was the Seine-Buci market in the 6th arrondissement, where literature for six of the nine candidates in the first round was

distributed on Sunday morning, April 17, and material for the two finalists, plus Communist Party literature urging a vote for Mitterand, was distributed on Sunday morning, May 1.

7. This was a meeting with senior citizens at Saint-Maur, on the outskirts of Paris, on the afternoon of April 11.

8. This was broadcast on TF 1 and A 2 on April 28 from 8:30 - 10:45 p.m.

9. At the Parc des Expositions (Exposition Park), Le Bourget, on Friday, April 22.

10. I viewed a videotape of the Dukakis speech, delivered on July 21 in Atlanta, and watched the Bush acceptance speech in new Orleans on August 18 live on television.

11. The first presidential debate was on Sunday, September 25 from 7 - 8:30 p.m. C.S.T. and the second at the same time on Thursday, October 13. The Vice-Presidential debate, again at the same time, took place on Wednesday, October 5.

12. In addition to a variety of TV news coverage, 30-second political advertisements of both candidates, two five-minute Dukakis ads, and the half-hour presentations on election eve on all three networks by Dukakis at 7 p.m. C.S.T. and Bush at 7:30 C.S.T., these included the following interviews: On October 10 from 10:30 - 11:30 p.m. on CBS, a "Newsmaker" interview with Dukakis by the news anchors of CBS affiliates in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Los Angeles; on October 25 from 10:30 p.m. - midnight on ABC, a "Nightline" interview with Dukakis by Ted Koppel; five-minute interviews by Tom Brokaw on the NBC evening news, with Bush on

October 31 and with Dukakis on November 1; three-minute interviews by Charles Gibson on ABC's "Good Morning America" with both Bush and Dukakis on October 31, November 1, 2, 3, and 4; and a lengthy interview with Dukakis on the PBS MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour on October 31.

13. On Tuesday, October 4 at the McGaw Field House, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

14. If a candidate were to obtain a majority of the votes cast in the first round -- a highly unlikely occurrence given the number of parties represented -- that would end the election.

15. Paid political advertising in the print media during the official campaign period was prohibited by a law of December 29, 1966. This prohibition was extended to the audiovisual media by a law of December 13, 1985. But a law of September 30, 1986, provides for the possibility of political ads being allowed on radio and television, as they are in the print media, outside of the official campaign period, although Article 16 of a law of March 11, 1988 postpones this possibility for four years.

16. Article 11 of law of July 19, 1977.

17. Law of March 11, 1988.

18. The comparable U.S. legislation is the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as amended in 1974.

19. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

20. The treasurer of Raymond Barre's campaign estimated that the Chirac campaign would spend 700 million francs by the evening of the second round of voting. The legal maximum was 140 million

francs, and Barre was said to be spending a total of 120 million. Le Nouvel Observateur, April 15-21, 1988, p. 39.

21. Article 12 of a decree of March 14, 1964, sets forth the rules for these emissions.

22. The National Commission of Communication and Liberties (CNCL), which is the agency charged by law with the responsibility for overseeing fair coverage of election campaigns by radio and television, found it necessary at the beginning of April, 1988, to write a letter to all but one of the TV networks criticizing them for giving inadequate news and interview coverage to the minor party candidates and demanding that they make amends. The letter was published in full in the April 1 issue of L'Humanite, the Communist Party organ, which was, of course, pleased to give the matter as much publicity as possible.

23. Section 315 of the Communication Act of 1934 is the so-called equal time rule. Section 312 (a) (7) was an amendment to the Communication Act of 1934 adopted as part of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and requires licensees to allow "reasonable access" for the purchase of reasonable amounts of time.

24. The only time I saw, or even heard of, the minor party candidates on television was through fifteen-minute interviews conducted with two of them by the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour. Lenora Fulani, candidate of the New Alliance Party, who was on the ballot in 50 states, was interviewed on October 18, and Ron Paul of the Libertarian Party, who was on the ballot of 46 states, was interviewed on October 24.

25. Liberation, April 26, 1988, p.2; Liberation, May 9, 1988, p.2.

26. New York Times, November 13, 1988.

27. Liberation, April 18, 1988, p.15, for example, reports fights on the previous Saturday between Barre and Chirac partisans over the posting of "sauvages" (wildcat or illegal) affiches in a Paris suburb.

28. Le Nouvel Observateur, April 1-7, 1988, p.34 reports that "the meetings of Francois Mitterand will start toward 7 p.m. so that the pictures can be broadcast in the 8 p.m. TV news." With the American candidates out on the stump all day every day there were always major events that could be scheduled in time for coverage on the TV evening news.

29. President Mitterand spoke for one hour and fifty minutes at his rally in Rennes on April 8 and for one hour and forty-five minutes at a rally in Lyons on April 15. Le Monde, April 17-18, 1988, p.6; Le Nouvel Observateur, April 22-28, 1988, p.40.

30. A sampling of headlines from Le Figaro includes the following: "The Attacks Against the RPR State (accusations that Chirac's RPR Party had used its powers of appointment to take over the entire state) Can Fool Nobody. It's The Socialist Party That Colonizes The State" (March 30, p.1); "A Blank Check for 7 Years. Francois Mitterand Seeks To Establish An Emotional And Irrational Relationships With The French" (March 31, p.6); "Chirac Indignant At Charge of Racism" (April 1, p.5); "The Socialist Emptiness" (April, 6, p.5); "61% Of The French: Chirac A Good Prime Minister" (April 12, p.1); "First Round: The Majority (Chirac and Barre

parties) Mobilizes" (April 22, p.1).

31. Two of the 23 newspapers in which the letter appeared were in Paris -- Liberation of Thursday, April 7 (in which it occupied all of pages 10-22 inclusive) and Le Parisien of the same date. Le Figaro refused to sell space for the letter, denouncing it on its front page as demagoguery (Le Figaro, April 7, 1988, p.1). The letter could not be published in the prestigious Le Monde because of a technicality -- as an afternoon paper which always carries the following day's date, the Thursday afternoon issue of Le Monde was dated Friday, April 8, which placed it into the first day of the official campaign period when paid political advertising is not permitted.

32. Liberation, April 7, 1988, p.3.

33. See note 15, supra.

34. Decision #88-73 of the National Commission of Communication and Liberties, March 10, 1988. Journal Officiel, March 23, 1988, pp. 3915-3918.

35. Survey research estimates of listeners to the official campaign emissions ranged from five to ten per cent of the total television audience. Liberation, April 19, 1988, p.12; Le Point, April 16, 1988, p.64.

36. See "Thrust of TV Campaign Ads Can Vary With The Territory," New York Times, November 1, 1988, pp.1 and 12.

37. The Dukakis half-hour was devoted largely to the candidate, dressed informally and seated on a sofa, responding to questions about his positions that had been raised in the campaign. The Bush

half-hour consisted primarily of film clips of excerpts from his acceptance speech, of his activities on the campaign trail, and with his family, all against a musical background.

38. L'Heure de Verite (The Hour of Truth), for example, runs for about ninety minutes. Three journalists are each given an uninterrupted block of twenty minutes a piece to question the guest and pursue questions not answered to their satisfaction. There are, additionally, some questions telephoned in by viewers.

39. Dukakis was interviewed for ninety minutes by Ted Koppel on ABC's Nightline, for twenty minutes by Dan Rather on the CBS Evening News, for an hour by Larry King on CNN, for an hour by the anchors of CBS affiliates in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago and Los Angeles on a Newsmakers program aired in those four cities, and for a major segment of the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour.

40. Bush declined the invitations from Ted Koppel, Dan Rather, Newsmakers, and MacNeil-Lehrer, but did appear, as did Dukakis, in brief interviews with Charles Gibson on Good Morning America and Tom Brokaw's NBC evening news.

41. For example, Mitterand appeared on TF 1's Questions a Domicile on March 31 while Barre and Chirac appeared on L'Heure de Verite on april 5 and 7. Mitterand did decline an invitation to appear on the latter program on April 6, sandwiched in between Barre and Chirac. He offered to have Michel Rocard (named Prime Minister after the election) appear as his substitute, but the network declined that alternative. Liberation, April 2-3, 1988, p. 7.

42. Christine Okrent has written a book about the 1981 debate

entitled Duel (Hachette, 1988). The Liberation front page headline on April 28, the morning of the debate, in large black letters, was "Duel," and the headline on Le Figaro's front page the morning afterwards was "Le duel." Le Monde's story of April 27 about the event also referred to it as "le duel."

43. The figures reported in Le Parisien, April 29, 1988, pp. 1 and 4-5 were 54% of the TV audience, or twenty million people.

44. See Media Technology and the Vote, Joel L. Swerdlow, ed. The Annenberg Washington Program in Communication Policy Studies of Northwestern University, 1988.

45. In contrast to the roughly 7% of the TV audience which listened to the official campaign emissions, a record 27% were reported to have listened regularly to the Bebete show. Le Point, April 16, 1988, p.64.

46. The Willie Horton ad is discussed in the New York Times, November 3, 1988, pp.1 and 16. Chirac's strongest attack on the vote-for-immigrants issue came in a speech at a rally in Lyons on April 13. Le Figaro, April 14, 1988, p.7.

47. Apparently seeking to underscore his position with respect to terrorism, Prime Minister Chirac, three days before the election, ordered a military strike against a group of Kanaks (the New Caledonia Independence Movement) who were holding twenty-three gendarmes hostage in a New Caledonia grotto. The hostages were freed, but nineteen Kanaks and two members of the assault force were killed in the process. Le Monde, May 6, 1988, p.1.

48. This occurred in the latter part of the debate during a

discussion of illegal immigration. After Mitterand had raised a question about the consistency of Chirac's views on this subject, Chirac replied, "Me, I have not changed; I have applied the same policy for two years, Monsieur le President."

49. Liberation, April 9-10, 1988, p.6.

50. Liberation, April 14, 1988, p.8; Le Figaro, April 15, 1988, p.1.

51. This story was reported under a banner headline on the front page of Liberation, April 30-May 1, 1988, reading "Pasqua Adopts Le Pen."

52. According to exit polls reported in the New York Times, November 10, 1988, p.18, there was the following correlation between income and one's vote:

	Bush	Dukakis
Under $12,5000	37%	62%
12,500 - 24,999	49	50
25,000 - 34,999	56	44
35,000 - 49,999	56	42
50,000 - 100,000	61	38
Over 100,000	65	32

According to the breakdown of votes by arrondissements (sections) of Paris reported in Le Monde, May 10, 1988, p.16, Chirac obtained a clear majority in the more affluent areas (1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 16th, 17th) while Mitterand led in the lower income sections (2nd, 3rd, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 18th, 19th, 20th). The 4th and 14th arrondissements were split almost

fifty-fifty. The greatest imbalance -- Chirac with 79% against Mitterand with 21% -- was in the 16th arrondissement, the wealthiest district in the city.

53. In the U.S., the strong lead in the polls held by Dukakis in mid-Summer melted away after the Republican convention in August. Thereafter Bush gradually developed a lead which he then maintained all the way to election day, although it narrowed somewhat following the first debate between the presidential candidates and after the vice-presidential debate, and again during the final week of the campaign. By contrast, in France, an IFOP poll at the beginning of April showed Mitterand favored over Chirac by 55% to 45% (Liberation, April 2-3, p.1.);another poll announced at 11 p.m. on April 24, immediately after the results of the first round of voting had been determined, showed Mitterand leading Chirac by 53% to 47% (TF 1 News); and the final result, of course, was 54% to 46% -- all only marginal changes.

54. The conditioning of public financing on a candidate's willingness to limit total spending to that amount, as provided for in the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

55. Article 16 of the law of March 11, 1988, delays for four years from the date of its promulgation the entering into effect of a provision -- Article 14 of the law of September 30, 1986 -- that allows for the possibility of audiovisual political advertising outside the official campaign period.

56. See note 24, supra.